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ON BOBBLING HEADS, PAPARAZZI, AND
JUSTICE HUGO BLACK
Shubha Ghosh*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The vexing questions raised by the intersection of the
First Amendment and the right of publicity' make the heads
of many constitutional and intellectual property scholars nod,
while the heads of other scholars, appropriately enough, bobble. The nodding heads recognize the particular challenges of
balancing the right to prevent the unauthorized, and intrusive, use of one's name or likeness against the right to speak,
whether through news gathering or through creative forms of
expression. Heads begin bobbling, however, when the judicial
attempts to balance become mired in questions of property,
incentives to create, transformative uses, and often tenuous
distinctions between commercial and non-commercial speech.
This article offers a simple solution, harkening back to Professor Wechsler's proposal in his oral argument before the
United States Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan' and Justice Hugo Black's dissenting opinion in the
same case:3 Provide absolute immunity for the use of the
name or likeness of a public official from a right of publicity
* Shubha Ghosh is Professor of Law at University at Buffalo Law School, SUNY
and Professor of Law (designate) at Southern Methodist University Dedman
School of Law. He thanks the staff of the Santa Clara Law Review for its
editorial work and William Gallagher, Tyler Ochoa, and David Welkowitz for
the invitation to contribute to the symposium.
1. The right of publicity is grounded in the common law right of privacy
and allows a party to sue for unauthorized use of her likeness or name for commercial purposes. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS § 19.3 (1999). The right has
been made statutory in almost all states. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West
2005).
2. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1965).
3. See Brief for Petitioner at 38, N.Y Thmes, 376 U.S. 254; NY Times, 376
U.S. at 296 (Black, J., concurring).
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claim. This proposal is the only sensible solution to the inevitably unsuccessful attempt to balance the right of publicity
against the First Amendment.4
Appeal to the New York Times decision in the context of
right of publicity cases may be greeted by some skepticism.
On the surface, this proposal appears to be at odds with the
Supreme Court's holding in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
BroadcastingCo.5 that the "actual malice" standard, adopted
in New York Times as a limit on defamation claims brought
by public officials, has no application to the right of publicity.6
In actuality, however, the proposal does not conflict with this
holding.7 Rather, the key point is that Justice Black's dissent,
with its absolutist protection for First Amendment rights, is
the most apt framework for understanding the right of publicity where public officials are concerned. With regard to the
holding in Zacchini, the proposal for absolute immunity is
perfectly consistent with the Court's distinction between privacy torts, in which falsity is an element of liability (limited
by the appropriate application the actual malice standard),
and those, like right of publicity, in which falsity is not required 8 and strict liability is necessary. When public officials
assert publicity rights, the assumption of strict liability 9 for
right of publicity claims should be reversed to a rule of no liability. Such an approach is consistent not only with the
First Amendment values articulated in New York Times, but
also, counterintuitively, with the privacy and economic values
of the right of publicity. °
Some will undoubtedly argue that this proposal's attempt
to avoid chilling speech will serve only to freeze other dangerous slopes. Visions of paparazzi stalking elected officials or
even candidates for public office and then seeking protection
under the proposed absolute immunity may spring to mind.

4. See discussion infra Part III.
5. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
6. Id. at 574.
7. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
8. See J. THOMAS McCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY §
3.26 (2d. ed. 2004).
9. See Hanson v. Globe Newspaper Co., 34 N.E. 462, 464 (Mass. 1893) (establishing that common law defamation is a strict liability tort). For a discussion of the rule of liability in common law defamation, see EPSTEIN, supra note
1, at § 18.7.
10. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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A rule of no liability would potentially subject individuals
dedicated to public service to harassment from media. The
media will be allowed to use their names and likenesses without restraint for advertising, in cheap front page spreads or
on the evening news. These concerns are not significant because many of them can be addressed with existing laws that
protect privacy, such as false light1 1 or intrusion, 2 or other
aspects of intellectual property law, such as false association
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 3 The property protections of the right of publicity are superfluous to protect these
interests where a public official is concerned and are potentially harmful since First Amendment values are at stake.
However, as demonstrated in the discussion of the recent
European Court of Human Rights decision in the Princess
Caroline case, 4 the problem of whether to protect the private
lives of public officials provides special challenges for the absolutist position.
Moreover, recognizing the right of publicity for public officials is inconsistent with the justifications for protecting
publicity. The right of publicity serves two goals. The first is
to protect intrusions into one's private sphere through the
commercial appropriation of one's personality. 6 This protection safeguards the private person from being made public
without his or her consent. 7 The second goal is to protect the
investment that a public person has made in one's persona,
from which he or she obtains economic value from misappropriation without consent. 8 These two goals are complementary and together permit the self-regulation of one's identity,

11. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, § 19.5 (describing that "certain public portrayals of [plaintiff] are sufficiently 'off that they could prove to be highly offensive to ordinary individuals").
12. See id. § 19.2 (liability for intentional intrusion "upon the solitude or seclusion of another") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977)).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000) (provision of Lanham Act, the federal statute
that governs trademark law, which prevents use of trademark to create false
association in the mind of consumers).
14. Case of Von Hannover v. Germany, 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (June 24, 2004).
15. See discussion infra Part TV.B.
16. See, e.g., Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of
Publicity,49 DUKE L.J. 383, 411 (1999).
17. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 71 (Ga. 1905).
18. See, e.g., Ira J. Kaplan, They Can't Take That Away From Me: Protecting Free Trade in Public Images from Right of Publicity Claims, 18 LOY. L.A.
ENT. L.J. 37 (1997).
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protecting both those who want to remain non-public and
those persons who have voluntarily obtained value from their
publicity.
Neither of these goals applies to those who hold public office. The first goal is irrelevant since a public figure is by
definition in the public sphere. Thus, while the decision to
forsake some dimension of one's privacy does not create a license to invade all of one's private sphere, protection under
the property claim for right of publicity may not be the best
option. Instead, the private life of a public official is better
protected by claims of false light and defamation. Furthermore, while the public official often creates a public persona,
much like an actor or other celebrity, the public persona of a
public official must be held up to public scrutiny and examination and is hence not a tradable commodity like the public
persona of a celebrity. An Elvis impersonator may be commenting on the Elvis image, but more likely he really would
like to be Elvis, usurping his fame, glory, and cachet. A
George Bush impersonator (whether of Bush pere or Bush
fils) is making a different statement and almost certainly has
no desire to step into the shoes or lifestyle of his target. If
right of publicity of a public official is protected, the special
public status that a political persona has for the purposes of
commentary, criticism, and the political process is ignored. 9
Therefore, the right of publicity is inappropriate for a public
official since it serves neither to prevent inappropriate publicity nor to regulate the appropriate marketing of one's public
identity.
The proposed abolition of the right of publicity for public
officials, within the goals of the right itself, is consistent with
most accepted visions of politics."0 As the debate over the
Vanna White case 2' indicates, scholars differ greatly with regard to how much celebrities should be allowed to profit from
a property right in their public persona. It seems inconsistent with the values of politics to allow a public official to
profit from his or her political persona. While we may be
comfortable with the notion of an actor franchising his likeness for profit, a certain degree of uneasiness is raised if a
19. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, § 18.16.1 (discussing constitutional privilege

in the context of public officials).
20. See discussion infra Part III.C.
21. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
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politician decides to spend his term in office selling paraphernalia that markets his political identity. The uneasiness
stems from a concern over a politician profiting from his position, and from the inconsistency of public service and private
The commercial motives informing the
aggrandizement.
right of publicity are far removed from the motivations that
lead or should lead people to seek public office. This uneasiness is the catalyst for the proposal to disallow right of publicity claims by public officials through an absolutist application
of the First Amendment as articulated by Justice Black.
I present my argument as follows: Section II presents the
current doctrinal limits placed on the right of publicity by the
First Amendment and compares it with the limitations set by
New York Times.22 Section III follows from the discussion of
New York Times to examine how public officials are different
from celebrities under the right of publicity, and why these
differences support an absolutist First Amendment limit on
the right of publicity for public officials." Section IV presents
how the absolutist position would work in practice through an
analysis of the Schwarzenegger bobblehead dispute and the
recent decision by the European Court of Human Rights. 4
Section V concludes. 5
II. THE CURRENT LINE BETWEEN THE FIRST AMENDMENT
AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

Before making the case to exempt public officials from
right of publicity claims on First Amendment grounds, it is
necessary to present the current state of the law on the First
Amendment and right of publicity and compare the First
Amendment skein with the New York Times standard. This
discussion is designed to emphasize the salient First Amendment issues raised by the right of publicity as a comparison
with the protection of speech rights within defamation law.

22.
23.
24.
25.

See discussion
See discussion
See discussion
See discussion

infra Part II.B.2.
infra Part III.
infra Section IV.
infra Section V.
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The FirstAmendment Skein for the Right of Publicity
1. JudicialBackground: Pre-Zacchini

Freedom of expression and the right of publicity have enjoyed a strained relationship from the first recognition of the
tort claim. In the 1902 case Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Company,26 the New York Court of Appeals declined to
recognize a privacy cause of action for the unauthorized use of
a young woman's image in an advertisement.2 7 Referring to
the famous Warren and Brandeis article" advocating the privacy tort as "a clever article,"29 the majority extolled the freedom of expression and limited it solely by a cause of action for
libel or harm to reputation. 0 Although the New York Court
did not engage in extensive First Amendment analysis, even
to the meager extent the jurisprudence existed in 1902, the
majority opinion demonstrated a clear hesitancy to expand
the right of privacy because of its potential negative limits on
free expression. 1 The Georgia Supreme Court, however, went
to the other extreme in 1905 in Pavesich v. New EnglandLife
Insurance Company.32 This ruling was the first state court
opinion to recognize the right of privacy. 2 The First Amendment succumbed to the privacy claims of an Atlanta artist,
whose image was misappropriated in an advertisement. 4 As
the Pavesichcourt carefully noted:
The stumbling block which many have encountered in the
way of a recognition of the existence of a right of privacy
has been that the recognition of such right would inevitably tend to curtail the liberty of speech and of the press.
The right to speak and the right of privacy have been coexistent. Each is a natural right, each exists, and each must
be recognized and enforced with due respect for the
other.32

26. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
27. Id. at 447-48.
28. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890).
29. Roberson, 64 N.E. at 444.
30. Id. at 448.
31. Id. at 448-49.
32. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
33. Id. at 70.
34. Id. at 68-69.
35. Id. at 73.
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The court concluded, however, that in the advertising
copy, there was "not the slightest semblance of an expression
of an idea, a thought, or an opinion, within the meaning of the
constitutional provision which guaranties to a person the
right to publish his sentiments on any subject."36 As with the
Roberson court, the Pavesich court found no need to balance
the right of free speech against rights of publicity.3 7 However,
unlike the Roberson court, the Pavesich court held that in the
tension between the right to be free of unwanted publicity
and the right to speak, the need for detente disfavored
speech.38
The post-Pavesich case law on the First Amendment and
the right of publicity followed the anti-speech precedent set
by the Georgia Supreme Court39 until the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of First Amendment limitations on the right of publicity straight on in Zacchini. For
those familiar with the case, describing this 1977 decision as
"straight on" is true, perhaps, in name only since the Court's
holding rested on reasoning more relevant to copyright than
right of publicity." The Zacchini case, for example, is less on
point than the New York Supreme Court's 1968 decision,
Paulsen v. PersonalityPosters, Inc., 1 in which the trial court
held that the right of publicity claim gave way to the First
Amendment when a political figure was at issue under, surprisingly enough, New York Times.2 Nonetheless, despite its
disappointing result for First Amendment advocates, the Zacchini case is the sole decision on the First Amendment and
the right of publicity from the highest court in this country.
Landing into First Amendment territory with the thud of
a cannonball, the United States Supreme Court's analysis in
Zacchinicentered on the balance between the economic interests of the celebrity whose fame arose from being shot from a

36. Id. at 80.
37. Id. at 81 (stating that unauthorized publication of likeness for profit is
unquestionably an invasion of the right of publicity).
38. Id. at 80 (unauthorized publication of likeness not within the "liberty to
print" of U.S. Constitution).
39. See MCCARTHY, supra note 8, § 8:4.
40. See 433 U.S. at 576-77 (discussing purpose of right of publicity as providing economic incentives and compensation for investment in creative activity).
41. 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y. Special Term 1968).
42. Id. at 506-07.
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cannon and surviving and the public-mindedness of a local
news station in Ohio that broadcasted the entire act on the
43
evening news.
The Ohio Supreme Court found in favor of the news station, holding, as the U.S. Supreme Court described, that a
newscaster was "constitutionally privileged to include in its
newscasts matters of public interests that would otherwise be
protected by the right of publicity, absent an intent to injure
or to appropriate for some nonprivileged purpose."" The state
court holding, based on the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution and the free speech provisions of the Ohio state
constitution, would have allowed a right of publicity claim
against a newscaster broadcasting a matter of public interest
only upon a showing of actual malice." The state court's holding rested on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Time, Inc.
v. Hill," which had introduced the element of malice in the
case of a suit against a media defendant for the tort of false
light, following the analysis of New York Times for defamation. 8 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, reversed the Ohio
Supreme Court on the grounds that false light claims and
right of publicity claims are different. The difference between
the two claims, as articulated by the Court, made it inappropriate to introduce the element of malice into the right of publicity claim. 9 In effect, the New York Times approach, while
appropriate for defamation and false light, was not appropriate for right of publicity.
The key difference for the Court was the nature of the
plaintiffs interest protected by these various torts.5" Defamation, false light, and right of publicity are all strict liability
torts. Strict liability, however, conflicts with the right of ex43. Zacchhi, 433 U.S. at 563-64.
44. Id. at 569.
45. Id. at 567-68.
46. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
47. The actual malice standard was extended to a false light cause of action
because of the close affinity with a defamation action. Both allow someone to
sue for harm to one's reputation in the community. A public official's ability to
curtail political speech is as a great under a false light claim as it is under a
defamation claim. The actual malice standard limits a public official's ability to
curtain speech under either claim. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, § 19.5.
48. TIme, Inc., 385 U.S. at 386-88.
49. Zacchmi, 433 U.S. at 573.
50. Id. at 574-75 (describing tort of right of publicity in terms of economic
harm).
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pression when someone utters a statement that allegedly defames the subject of the statement, puts him in a false light,
or violates his right of publicity.5' In New York Times and
Hill, the Court protected First Amendment interests by imposing liability for defamation or false light only if the plaintiff could show a high degree of fault on the part of the
speaker.12 The Ohio Supreme Court attempted to extend the
protection to the right of publicity, but failed to distinguish
among these torts." Defamation and false light claims protect the reputation of the plaintiff, because when reputation
is at stake, the Court reasoned, it is sensible to inquire
whether the media defendant intended to harm the plaintiff
or, instead, recklessly reported the facts in a way that damaged the plaintiffs reputation.5 4 The right of publicity, by
contrast, protects the economic interests of the plaintiff much
in the same way as copyright and patent laws. When economic interests are at stake, the Court's logic continued, the
media defendant should not be excused on speech grounds,
and instead be held strictly liable, if it has deprived the plaintiff of his entire economic interest, as the Court thought the
newspaper had done when it broadcasted Zacchini's entire
cannonball act.55
2.

InterpretingZacchini

The Zacehiniopinion lacks in many respects, the first one
being that of clear articulation. One possible articulation is
that a defendant is not immunized from a right of publicity
under the First Amendment if he has deprived the plaintiff of
the full economic value of the right. This articulation is helpful in that it provides some guidance for future cases. For example, presumably if the defendant had shown only part of
the act, then a First Amendment defense can be invoked. The
problem, of course, is that this articulation of the holding,
which I propose is the best that we can do based on the opinion, does not provide a clear First Amendment analysis. Conventional categories, such as commercial versus noncommercial speech or public forum versus non-public forum,
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Seeid.at573-74.
Id. at 570.
Id. at 570-71 (according to the United States Supreme Court).
See id. at 573-74.
Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 572.
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are noticeably absent. Because these issues are left unresolved, it should not be surprising that the Zacchini case
raises more questions than it answers. Of course, many judicial opinions raise more questions than they answer. The
problem here is that the Zacchini case does not even answer
the question it purportedly intended to resolve: What is the
nature of the First Amendment privilege for right of publicity
claims?
One way to reconcile the Zacchini case within First
Amendment jurisprudence is to create a new category of free
speech jurisprudence. The most likely candidate is to recognize Zacchini as a case involving the conflict between property and speech, as opposed to the current categorization of
speech. Certainly, the Court's discussion that the interests at
issue are more akin to copyright and patent than to reputational interests is consistent with this categorization. The
problem with this interpretation is the implication for future
claims. If the trigger for the loss of any First Amendment defense is that the defendant has taken the full value of plaintiff's publicity rights, what is the result if, for example, the
defendant makes unauthorized use of the plaintiffs name?
Does this use of the name constitute loss of all value since the
plaintiff has lost the value of licensing the name in this instance to the defendant? Or does this use of the name constitute loss of no value since the plaintiff still retains the right
to profit from licensing the name in other instances? The latter result seems more sensible given the doctrine of nominative use that permits the mention of names in newspaper reporting or analogous contexts without the requirement of
licensing.5 6 Thus, full economic value must mean something
more than the profits that can be earned from licensing the
right to the particular defendant. However, if this is so, then
this reasoning conflicts with the determination that Zacchini
lost all value by the broadcast of his act on a local evening
news program in Ohio, because he did not lose the ability to
market himself in states that did not pick up the broadcast or
to market the act through his authorized sales of videotapes
of the act. Defining this new category of property-speech conflicts created by Zacchini requires a more rigorous articula-

56. See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir.
1992).
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tion of the economic interests at stake.
The issue of economic interests becomes more perplexing
upon closer scrutiny of the question: What aspect of Zacchini's
right of publicity was at issue in the case? Factually what
was misappropriated was not simply Zacchini's name or likeness, but, instead, his entire act, which was integral to his
57 Motschenpersona.
The case is similar to the Midler,
bacher,58 and White5 9 cases, in which various aspects of the
plaintiffs' activities constituted the publicity right, respectively, the voice and singing style, class of racecar, and turning letters while blonde. More sensibly, especially in light of
the Court's appeal to copyright and patent, the Zacchini case
could be seen as a live performance case, with the news station's unauthorized taping and broadcasting of the entire act
analogous to the bootlegging of a band's live concert. When
seen this way, one of the problems with the Zacchini case is
that of improper categorization. While the Ohio court may
have had a better approach to balancing the First Amendment with the right of publicity than did the U.S. Supreme
Court, there still remains the nagging question of whether
the case was a right of publicity case at all. Upon closer scrutiny, the only Supreme Court case addressing the First
Amendment limits on the right of publicity is a striking example of bad facts making even worse law.
3.

Post-Zacchini Case Law RegardingRight of Publieity
Claims
The inadequacy of the Zacehini decision created difficulty
for subsequent courts to define a clear boundary between the
First Amendment and right of publicity claims. There have
been three notable post-Zacehiniapproaches: (1) demarcating
a line between commercial and non-commercial speech, (2)
imposing a higher standard for speech in the case of injunctive relief, and (3) developing a doctrine of transformative
use.
The first approach denies First Amendment protection
when the right-of-publicity defendant is engaged in commercial exploitation of the plaintiffs publicity. The Georgia Su57. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
58. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir.
1974).
59. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
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preme Court's decision is a case involving the unauthorized
manufacture and sale of busts of the late Reverend Martin
Luther King, Jr.6' The majority, following its precedent in
Pavesich, held that the busts, created for purely "financial
gain," were not speech protected by the First Amendment. 6' A
concurring judge dissented from this First Amendment
analysis, stating that under First Amendment jurisprudence,
the bust did constitute speech, but concluded that the First
Amendment values gave way to the rights of protecting one's
public image in this case.62 The Georgia Supreme Court's approach illustrates the application of First Amendment jurisprudence for commercial speech in the right of publicity context. Under this approach, appropriately applied, the First
Amendment limits on the right of publicity would be based on
the standards created for protection of commercial speech.
The second approach in the case law applies a prior restraint analysis' to right of publicity claims.' This approach
is illustrated by the Second Circuit's decision in New York
Magazine v. Metropolitan TransportationAuthority,' a case
involving the transit authority's refusal to place an advertisement for New York Magazine on the side of city buses because the advertisement included an unauthorized use of
Mayor Giuliani's name.6 6 The Second Circuit held that the
magazine's ad was protected commercial speech and that the
67
city's refusal to run the ad was a prior restraint on speech.
The right of publicity, in this case, arose in an unusual manner, not as a direct claim brought by the mayor, but as a justification by the transit authority for not permitting the advertisements on the city buses.'
Nonetheless, the court's
analysis illustrates how prior restraint principles would apply
60. Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage
Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982).
61. Id at 700.
62. Id. at 708-09.
63. A prior restraint is a governmental regulation that restricts speech before it is communicated. See Near v. Minn., 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (state seeking
injunction against publication of newspaper is an example of a prior restraint).
64. For a discussion of prior restraints, see Mark Lemley & Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech and Injunctionsin IntellectualPropertyCases, 48 DUKE L.J.
147, 169-80 (1998).
65. N.Y. Magazine v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 136 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1998).
66. Id. at 125-26.
67. Id. at 131-32.
68. Id. at 126.
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to limit the right of publicity claim.69
The final, and most clearly articulated approach, is that
of the transformative use analysis, illustrated by the Sixth
Circuit's decision in ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing,Inc., a
case involving the unauthorized creation and distribution of a
commemorative painting of Tiger Woods winning the Masters
Tournament in Augusta in 1997.70 The Sixth Circuit, citing
precedent from the Ninth and Tenth Circuits,"2 as well as
from the California Supreme Court,7" ruled that the artwork
was protected from the right of publicity claim under the
First Amendment because it contained "significant transformative elements which made it especially worthy of First
Amendment protection and also less likely to interfere with
the economic interest protected by" the right of publicity. 4
Under a similar transformative use test, the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits also immunized from the right of publicity a magazine's alteration of a famous photograph of Dustin Hoffman
as his Tootsie character 5 and a company's creation of parody
baseball cards featuring the likenesses of major league baseball players.7 ' However, the fan's creation of a T-shirt depicting the likenesses of The Three Stooges was not protected by
the First Amendment under the California Supreme Court's
application of the transformative use test, because it lacked
transformative characteristics.7 7 Under the First Amendment, the transformative use approach creates immunity
from the right of publicity for highly creative uses of the
plaintiffs image, regardless of the commercial motivations of
the defendant.
The First Amendment skein for the right of publicity can
best be understood as creating a special category for propertyspeech conflicts." Using the Zacchini analysis, within this
69. See id. at 132.
70. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 918 (6th Cir. 2003).
71. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
72. Cardtoons L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Assoc., 95 F.3d 959
(10th Cir. 1996).
73. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
74. Jireh Publ'g,Inc., 332 F.3d at 938.
75. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1183.
76. Cardtoons,95 F.3d at 972-73.
77. Saderup Inc., 21 P.3d at 810.
78. For a discussion of property-speech conflicts, see Lemley & Volokh, supra note 64; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright within the First
Amendment Skein, 54 STAN L. REV. 1 (2001).

630

SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW

Vol: 45

category, speech claims trump the economic interests of the
right of publicity claimant when the speech claimant takes
less than the full economic value of the defendant. PostZacchini courts have tried to clarify this analysis by taking
into consideration the commercial nature of the defendant's
use of plaintiffs publicity, the prior restraint of limiting defendant's activities, and the transformative nature of defendant's use of plaintiffs publicity. Admittedly a work in progress, the First Amendment skein suffers from a lack of
coherence as courts have attempted to balance speech with
economic interests. A brief comparison with the approach to
First Amendment limitations on defamation claims hints at
the possibilities for providing some needed structure to the
right of publicity analysis, particularly when the publicity
rights of public officials are at issue.
B. ComparingSpeech Values in the Realms of Defamation
and Publicity
1. Overview
As the Ohio Supreme Court demonstrated in Zacchini,
the New York Times standard, which limits strict liability for
speech-related torts, serves as a beacon for protection of First
Amendment values."9 However, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in the same case illustrates limitations of this New
York Ymes approach.0 A closer examination of how New
York Times incorporates the First Amendment into speechrelated tort claims is helpful to understand why the right of
publicity should be limited for public official claimants.
The facts of New York Times are legendary.8' Arising
within the civil rights struggle in Alabama, the case was
sparked by a notice in The New York Times placed by the
NAACP to inform the public about actions against civil rights
workers in the South. The notice mentioned how civil rights

79. Zacchini,433 U.S. at 567-68.
80. Id.at 573.
81. For background history and discussion, see Kermit L. Hall, "Lies, Lies,
Lies": The Origns ofNew York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 9 COMM. L. & POLY 391
(2004); Anthony Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to "The CentralMeaning of the FirstAmendment", 83 COLUM. L. REV. 606
(1983); Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 782 (1986).
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workers had been harassed and jailed by public officials in
the State of Alabama and referred in general terms to Alabama police officers.82 The defamation suit brought against
the newspaper was grounded in Alabama law which provided
a defense of "fair comment."8 3 The problem for The New York
Times was that the notice contained a few details that were
factually inaccurate. The details concerning the arrest of
Martin Luther King, Jr. and the number and actions of the
protestors were admittedly trivial, but sufficient to defeat the
newspaper's defense of absolute truth under Alabama state
law."4 The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the lower court
judgment against The New York Times for the defamation
claim, holding that when a public official brings a defamation
claim he must show the defendant acted with actual malice,
meaning that the defendant published the defamation with
actual malice."'
Subsequent Supreme Court cases extended the New York
Times holding to the tort claims of false light and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and to public figures bringing
defamation claims.86 As explained above, the Supreme Court
refused to extend the holding to the right of publicity claim. 7
I am not advocating the application of the public official
analysis, employed by the New York Times majority, to the
right of publicity claim. Instead of extending the actual malice standard put forth by the New York Times majority to the
right of publicity claim, a better approach is to apply the absolutist approach proposed by Justice Black in his New York
Times dissent. Thus, a public official would not be allowed to
bring a right of publicity claim under any circumstances, a
point that I explain in the next section.
2.

The Implications ofJustice Black's Dissent in New
York Times

Justice Black's famous statement: "An unconditional
82. NY Times, 376 U.S. at 256-58.
83. Id. at 267 (fair comment required that the statement be "true in all [its]
particulars").
84. Id. at 259.
85. Id. at 280 (actual malice meaning that the defendant acted with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard to the truth of the statement).
86. See Time Inc., 385 U.S. 374; Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46
(1988); Curtis Publ'g v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
87. See discussion supra Part II.A. 1.
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right to say what one pleases about public affairs is what I
consider to be the minimum guarantee of the First Amendment," is perhaps the clearest rule in any area of law."8 This
"unconditional right" is what Professor Hebert Wechsler had
endorsed in his brief before the Supreme Court on behalf of
The New York Times. Evoking the Sedition Act of 1798,89
Professor Wechsler argued that the strict liability of the tort
of defamation is inappropriate when wielded by a public official against the press. ° For Professor Wechsler, absolute
immunity was the best option to mitigating the abuse of
defamation law by public officials." As alternatives, he proposed either a requirement that the public official show that
the newspaper acted with reckless disregard for the truth, the
position adopted by the New York Times majority, or that the
public official show special damages to his reputation. 92 The
issue of damages was particularly salient because of the halfmillion dollar verdict against The New York Times. Given
the relative ease with which damages could be found in defamation cases, either based on the sentiments of the fact finder
or the spinning of facts, the special damage alternative was
perhaps not viable. Either absolute immunity or a fault requirement was the only realistic option for the Court to adopt.
Justice Black's affirmation of an unconditional right
rested on recognizing the inadequacies of the other alternatives available to protect First Amendment values.93 The majority opinion did not comment on the possibility of recognizing an unconditional right.
Instead, it fashioned a
compromise position based on an appeal to state defamation
law; it adopted the Kansas actual malice standard for defa-

88. N.YTimes, 376 U.S. at 297 (Black, J., concurring).
89. The Sedition Act of 1798 made it criminal to publish any false, scandalous, or malicious writing against the government or a governmental official.
Enacted under President John Adams as a means to protect the country from
alien influence, the act was used, until their repeal in 1802, by the majority
Federalist party against the minority Democratic-Republican party and served
to stifle political speech. See James P. Martin, When Repression is Democratic
and Constitutional:The Federalist Theory of Representation and the Sedition
Act of1798, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 117 (1999).
90. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 47-48 (arguing that permitting
a public official to sue a newspaper for defamation serves to repress speech like
the Sedition Act of 1798).
91. Id. at 55-56.
92. Id. at 60-69.
93. N.Y Times, 376 U.S. at 273-74.
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mation. 94 Justice Black, however, rejected any compromise
position, stating uncategorically:
[F]reedom to discuss public affairs and public officials is
unquestionably, as the Court today holds, the kind of
speech the First Amendment was primarily designed to
keep within the area of free discussion. To punish the exercise of this right to discuss public affairs or to penalize it
through libel judgments is to abridge or shut off discussion
of the very kind most needed. This Nation, I suspect, can
live in peace without libel suits based on public discussions of public affairs and public officials. But I doubt that
a country can live in freedom where its people can be
made to suffer physically or financially for criticizing their
government, its actions, or its officials. 95
While the majority made it more difficult for public officials to bring defamation claims, Justice Black's position
would have barred such suits since the mere threat of a
defamation suit would be enough to chill the kind of political
discourse necessary for a democracy.
Justice Black's position has been criticized as too speechfriendly, turning the marketplace of ideas into a realm of
mudslinging against public officials.96 Given the state of current political discourse,97 however, it is hard to say that the
majority position, which is the current state of the law of
defamation, fares any better in uplifting political discourse.
Nonetheless, there is something discomfiting about a world in
which public officials can be defamed with impunity. The image of the late Senator Edmund Muskie reduced to tears in
the streets of New Hampshire because of the scurrilous reporting of The Manchester Guardian comes to mind at the
mention of a press unfettered in its coverage of public officials. Despite the dangers posed by Justice Black's position
on defamation law, his absolutist position is perfectly appro94. See id, at 279-80 (citing Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281 (1908)).
95. N.Y imes, 376 U.S. at 296-97.
96. For a discussion of some of the criticism of Justice Black's position, see
John C.P. Goldberg, JudgingReputation:Realism and Common Law in Justice
White's Defamation Jurisprudence,74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1471 (2003).
97. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT? 97-98
(2003) ("freedom of expression diminishes the gap between a nation's leaders
and its citizens, and for that reason promotes the monitoring of the former by
the latter"). But see Epstein, supra note 81 (arguing that the constitutional
protection of speech may stifle the communication of certain political viewpoints
for fear of unfavorable response).
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priate as a limit on the right of publicity. The Court was correct in not extending the New York Times fault standard to
the right of publicity in Zacchini, but it should have considered Justice Black's dissent. As demonstrated in the next
section, the absolutist position not only provides some guidance to the current uncertainties about First Amendment
limits on the right of publicity, but it also furthers both the
First Amendment values so forcefully articulated by Justice
Black and the purposes of the right of publicity as formulated
in current intellectual property jurisprudence."

III. WHY PUBLIC OFFICIALS ARE DIFFERENT FROM
CELEBRITIES

This section develops the case for exempting public officials from right of publicity claims. The argument progresses
in three steps. The first step is to show that the First
Amendment is implicated in the use of the image of a public
official, regardless of the manner of use.99 The second is to
show that public officials do not need the protections of the
right of publicity.' 0 The third, and final, point is that an absolutist position is consistent with most sensible normative
visions of politics.'0 1
A. The Use of the Image ofa PublicOBtcial Implicates the
FirstAmendment Regardless of the Nature of the Use
The First Amendment's application in the context of the
right of publicity is often unpredictable. The Georgia Supreme Court denied First Amendment protection in both
Pavesich and the Martin Luther King, Jr. bust case because
the uses at issue were low value speech, created for pure financial gain.0 2 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has been
more protective of pure commercial speech than the Georgia
courts, and the more recent right of publicity cases reflect this
1
higher degree of protection. 03
The Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits found that the First Amendment protected a limited
98. See discussion infra Part IV.
99. See discussion infra Part III.A.
100. See discussion infra Part III.B.
101. See discussion infra Part III.C.
102. See discussion supra Parts II.A. 1, II.A.2.
103. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001);
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
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edition painting, a magazine cover, and baseball trading
cards with celebrity images.
However, the California Supreme Court failed to extend First Amendment protection to
a T-shirt bearing the unauthorized likenesses of The Three
Stooges." 5
No organizing principle can explain these disparate results. As one commentator noted, the cases challenge conventional categories of commercial and non-commercial speech.' 6
The concept of transformativeness may provide guidance,
suggesting that First Amendment protection is ratcheted to
the amount of creativity provided by the defendant. 7 However, the word transformative masks, rather than dispels, the
elusiveness."8 The form of speech protected under the First
Amendment in right of publicity cases is a mystery awaiting a
solution.
The proposal of no liability provides a possible solution.
It is a solution that recognizes that all uses of the image of a
public official, whether on a T-shirt, a coffee mug, or in the
form of a bust, implicate First Amendment values. A purchaser of a commodity bearing the likeness of the current
president may seek to express approval or to show contempt
by desecrating the icon. In either instance, what is being expressed is a political opinion that is linked to the representation of the image. The same could be said for advertisements
that use the likeness of a public official. However, if the use
of the image of the public official does constitute false advertising or false endorsement, the proper cause of action falls
under a consumer protection statute, rather than a right of
publicity claim. 9 My proposed rule of no liability does not
conflict with existing consumer protection law. Instead, it
T

104. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003); Hoffman, 255 F.3d 1180; Cardtoons L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Assoc.,
95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996).
105. See Saderup,Inc., 21 P.3d 797.
106. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40
Hous. L. REV. 903 (2003).
107. See ETW Corp., 332 F.3d 915.
108. See, e.g., Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The More Things Change the
Less They Seem "Transformed:Some Reflections on FairUse, 46 J. COPYRIGHT
SoC'Y USA 251 (1998).
109. A consumer protection statute would be appropriate since the concern is
with the confusion to consumers arising from a false endorsement or false advertising rather than with an economic or personal harm to the public official
from use of his image.
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frees the marketplace of ideas to the use of the image of a
public official, except in those instances when the use constitutes false advertising or false endorsement that results in
consumer confusion.
A potential criticism to the proposal of absolute immunity
is that it, on the one hand, protects speech involving a public
official from a right of publicity claim, but, on the other hand,
exposes such speech to false advertising or false endorsement
claims. The latter, however, is less speech restrictive than a
right of publicity claim. Under a right of publicity claim, the
public official would be able to enjoin any use of his image except for those that are highly transformative.1 10 Under a false
advertising or false endorsement claim, however, the public
official would have to establish consumer confusion and prove
that the speech was false."' This last requirement potentially
triggers the First Amendment protections under the New
York i mes actual malice standard. The case of the Governor
Schwarzenegger bobblehead illustrates the difference." 2 Under a right of publicity claim, the Governor could enjoin the
depiction of his image with a gun. This was the result of the
settlement in the actual dispute. Under a false advertising or
false endorsement claim, however, the Governor could enjoin
the depiction of his image with the gun only if the depiction
caused consumer confusion as to his association with or endorsement of a gun or the particular make of the gun represented in the bobblehead. A right of publicity claim protects
the economic and property rights of the public official; a false
advertising or false endorsement claim protects the interests
of consumers to be free from confusion.
A potentially more devastating criticism of the proposal
is that it does not go far enough because it precludes only
public officials, and not public figures, from bringing a right
of publicity cause of action. The rule of no liability would not
alter the result in the Martin Luther King, Jr. bust case or in
the Vanna White case, each of which potentially chill speech.
A broad exemption to include public figures, as well as public
officials, would reduce a right of publicity to the tort of pri110. See, e.g., ETW Corp., 332 F.3d 915 (right of publicity claimant seeking
injunction of the use of his image).
111. See supra note 13, and accompanying text.
112. The Schwarzenegger Bobblehead Case: Introduction and Statement of
Facts,45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 552-54 (2005).

2005

PUBLICITYAND PUBLIC OFFICIALS

637

vacy, protecting only non-celebrities and would not be consistent with the two goals of the right of privacy - to protect
against unwanted invasions of private persons and to prevent
against unwanted commercial appropriation of public persons.' Furthermore, extending the proposal to include public
figures would not be consistent with the First Amendment
goals articulated by Justice Black in New York Times. In the
case of public figures, the need to balance economic interests
with speech values is more pressing than in the case of public
officials, where the need to protect economic interests is nonexistent, as I argue in the next section.
B. Public OfficialsDo Not Require Right ofPublicity
Protection
The right of publicity protects two complementary interests. The first interest is the right for the private person to
be free from the public realm. This privacy interest was first
recognized by a state court in Pavesich."' The second interest
is that of the public person to control the commercial uses of
his public image. This interest has its roots in the Second
Circuit's decision in Haelen Laboratories v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc.'15 The privacy dimension of the right of publicity
protects the individual's right to choose whether to enter the
public realm. The commercial dimensions protect the individual who has entered the public realm from unlawful misappropriations of the public persona. Together, the privacy
and commercial dimensions of the right of publicity serve to
regulate how individuals develop a public persona, from the
decision to remain in the shadows, safe from the public eye, to
the conscious cultivation of a commoditized public image.
It is difficult to discern where the interests of a public official fall in the spectrum of the right of publicity. Public officials often have public faces, at least at the highest levels of
office. Perhaps at lower levels of the bureaucracy an official
may desire remaining in the shadows, preferring to serve
without any public glory. However, elevating this desire to a
right is inconsistent with an open, democratic government. It
is one thing to respect the anonymity of a private citizen, and
113. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
114. Pavesich,50 S.E. 68.
115. Haelan Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.
1953).
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another to respect the wishes of a government official who
wishes to be completely private. In the case of a private citizen, we are affirming his autonomy. However, with a government official, we would be allowing him to elude the discipline of public scrutiny. Similarly, protecting the commercial
interests of public officials through the right of publicity assumes that an individual enters the public realm of politics
for the same reasons he enters the public realm of business or
of entertainment. The world of politics, however, may overlap
with that of the marketplace and of the theater, but the three
areas serve the public interest through different means and
for different ends."6 Allowing the right of publicity to protect
the persona of a public official would create the possibility of
sanctuary from public scrutiny and would conflate the varying public arenas of politics and the marketplace into an undifferentiated and confusing sphere.
Just as granting the right of publicity to public officials
will not provide any benefits, denying the right of publicity
will create no harm that cannot be remedied through other
causes of action. Intrusion into a public official's private
realm through unwanted photography or wiretapping is actionable outside of the right of publicity.117 Unauthorized use
of a public official's image for advertising or other commercial
purposes would most likely constitute false advertising or
false endorsement. 18 Furthermore, the denial of the right
would not destroy the value associated with a political persona. While the incentive effects provided by the right of publicity for creating a celebrity persona are arguably quite
small, they are large by comparison to the incentives the
right provides for the cultivation of a political identity. The
right of publicity did not make possible Abraham Lincoln's
beard, Theodore Roosevelt's wide smile, Richard Nixon's outstretched victory sign, Ronald Reagan's off-hand "well's," or
Bill Clinton's saxophone playing. These personae are iconic,
part and parcel with the need to cultivate a political identity
in order to gather public recognition and votes. The embarrassment of being found unoriginal serves as a better means
116. See RAYMOND GEUSS, PUBLIC GOODS, PRIVATE GOODS 12-13, 30-31
(2001) (analyzing differing conceptions of public and private in marketplace and
politics).
117. See discussion supraPartI.
118. See discussion supraPart I.
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for discouraging imitation than the pursuit of a right of publicity claim.
C. An Absolutist Positionfor the Right of Publicityof Public
Officials Is Consistent with Idealisticand Pessimistic Visions
of Politics
One argument for denying the right of publicity to public
officials is the distinction among different public arenas, particularly the worlds of the marketplace, entertainment, and
government. This argument is developed by demonstrating
that the right of publicity for public officials is consistent with
accepted normative visions of politics," 9 two of which are the
idealistic view of politics as a form of public service and the
pessimistic view of politics as a means for private aggrandizement. Under either vision, the right of publicity for public officials is unnecessary.
The public spirited vision of politics would negate the requirements for almost any private rights held by public officials, who are, by the very definition of public spiritedness,
motivated purely by munificence. However, this rarefied
view of politics is too idealized to be of any interest for my argument since it assumes away the problem. A realistic, public-interested vision of politics would posit public governance
as solely being about the pursuit of the public good by public
officials as administrators who are driven to serve the electorate. The right of publicity has no place within this vision
because the unauthorized use of the public official's image
poses no threat to his mission of satisfying the public interest.
Paparazzi may stalk and hawkers may display the official's
face next to their wares, but, except for the case of false endorsement or false advertising, the public interest has not
been undermined. The interlopers are nuisances, but nothing
of value would be lost because the official's mission is not to
cultivate the image or to profit from the image, but, instead,
to serve. There, perhaps, is the issue of public confidence,
separate from any concern with public confusion, in placing
119. For a discussion of conflicting normative visions of politics, see generally
MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC

PHILOSOPHY (1996) (discussing the contemporary pursuit for a philosophy of
political life); MATTHRE A. CRENSON & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, DOWNSIZING
DEMOCRACY: HOW AMERICA SIDELINES ITS CITIZENS AND PRIVATIZED ITS

PUBLIC (2002) (describing demise of public sphere in American government).
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the elected official's face next to a luxury automobile, laundry
detergent, or the latest financial product. However, if the
public official continues in his duties, the appearance of his
visage in the commercial realm, excepting for cases of falsity,
is a mere distraction.
Actual politics, however, does require the maintenance of
a public image, and the advocate of a pessimistic vision of
politics would contend that the public image is a mask for
private aggrandizement. Politics, in the pessimistic sense, is
part fun and part profit, with a heavy dosage of the latter.
However, allowing public officials to monetize their personae
through the right of publicity does not necessarily follow from
this pessimistic vision and is, in many respects, inconsistent
with its logic. If politicians develop a public image in order to
procure votes and are also allowed to profit from the marketing of such an image, the instrumental usage of the public
image becomes apparent and difficult to sustain. The electorate cannot be so readily fooled that with one hand it casts a
ballot for the politicians and with the other, it purchases
overpriced T-shirts, coffee mugs, mouse pads, and other
tchotchkies that bear his likeness. Perhaps, the right of publicity is the ultimate product of public choice theory: legal protection created by politicians for politicians.
To view politics as this type of sideshow, designed for entertainment value alone, seems inconsistent with the real effects that political decisions have on people's lives. A real war
is different from a staged one. A public official is not put into
office simply to entertain us, although there might be great
entertainment value in the offing. As such, the pessimistic
view of politics cannot articulate why an electorate would
choose a public official simply to allow him to profit from the
position. Can anyone be that entertaining or have a persona
so charismatic? The pessimistic view ignores the public interest motives that bring a person to seek political office and
cause people to vote him into office. On the other hand, once
some iota of public interest is recognized as necessary for
politics, we are brought back to the idealistic vision of politics
that was addressed above.
The right of publicity exists to protect the cultivation of
one's image in a public arena. However, the political arena is
not a relevant public for the purposes of the right of publicity.
Whether one is an idealist or one is a pessimist, a public offi-
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cial's public persona need not fall within the purposes of the
right of publicity and is cultivated for different ends than the
persona of an entertainer. The public sphere of politics is not
developed in the same way as the marketplace or the theater
and, thus, would be damaged through the promotion of the
20
interests that the right of publicity was designed to protect.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ABSOLUTIST POSITION FOR THE
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

The argument for disallowing right of publicity claims by
public officials rests on Justice Black's absolutist view of the
First Amendment, on the purposes of the right of the publicity, and on the differences between the political and market
arenas. Any legal theory, however, should be tested by actual
cases. This section tests the absolutist proposal against two
cases: the easy case of the Schwarzenegger bobblehead 2' and
the hard case of Princess Caroline of Monaco, 2 ' which was decided by the European Court of Human Rights a month before
the bobblehead settlement. 3 These two cases have more in
common than temporal proximity; each case illustrates the
importance and limits of the absolutist position.
A.

GovernorSch warzenegger Unarmed with BobblingHead

The Schwarzenegger bobblehead case provides an easy
case for the absolutist position. The depiction of a sitting
governor as a bobblehead figure armed with an assault rifle is
a form of commentary that should be protected under the
First Amendment. The fact that the sitting governor is a Hollywood action hero adds to the commentary and does not justify a right of publicity claim. To paraphrase Justice Black,
the right to criticize and comment on public officials, regardless of whether the commentary is labeled as parody or editorial, should not be compromised by the legal claims of public
officials. However, as stated previously, claims should exist
when falsity and public confusion are at stake.
Since no jurisdiction has adopted the absolutist proposal,
the "easy" bobblehead case may not have been resolved as

120.
121.
122.
123.

See GEUSS, supra note 116, at 95-96.
See discussion infraPart IV.A.
See discussion infraPart IV.B.
Case of Von Hannover v. Germany, 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (June 24, 2004).
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neatly as the settlement if it had progressed to trial. Most
likely, the district court would have applied some version of
the Ninth Circuit's approach in its HofTman decision and
scrutinized the transformativeness of the bobblehead doll. It
is very likely that the court would have found that the doll
was not transformative, but, rather, that it was a mere
tschotschke like the T-shirt in Saderup"2 or the bust in the
Martin Luther King case.'26 The fact that a media defendant
was not present, in contrast with the Hoffman case, would
also weigh against a finding of transformativeness protected
by the First Amendment.
My proposed disposition of the dispute is a counterfactual
layered upon a counterfactual, an analysis of how the court
should have decided the case if it had in fact decided the case.
There does not seem to be any meaningful way in which the
Ninth Circuit's approach to transformativeness can be applied without compromising First Amendment values raised
by the image of Governor Schwarzenegger. To say that the
bobblehead is crass commercialization, a knock-off of other
Schwarzenegger merchandise, ignores the fact that the figure
is of a governor, one that has played action heroes and is associated with a party that has engaged the country in miliOhio Discount Merchandise ("ODM"), the
tary combat.
manufacturer of the bobblehead, has recently released a figure of Governor Schwarzenegger dressed in drag as the ultimate "girlie man." 27 Perhaps, this depiction is more clearly a
parody or commentary of the governor's attacks on the California legislature. However, these figures, whether in high
heels or in camouflage, are three dimensional editorials, easier to digest and interpret than inches of newsprint. To ask
whether the figures are transformative of the Schwarzenegger image is to ponder the obvious.
Application of the transformativeness test could reach
the same result as the absolutist proposal. The test is not
124. See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
One can speculate on the various applications of the transformativeness test,
but one possibility for the court would be to consider the satirical aspects of.the
doll, which played off the militaristic dimensions of the characters that Arnold
Schwarzenegger has played.
125. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
126. See Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage
Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982).
127. Introduction and Statement ofFacts,supra note 112, at 555.
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damaged if a judge reasons that the editorial commentary of
an assault rifle or high heels is sufficiently transformative to
be justified or excused under the right of publicity. The value
of the approach, however, is its economy and its clear espousal of First Amendment values. The economy comes from
knowing that once a public official's image is being used,
there is no right of publicity claim. More importantly, this
approach acknowledges that the rules are different for the political arena than for the marketplace. In the political sphere,
the creation and appropriation of a political image, whether
in high art or lowly bobbleheads, is the type of speech and
commentary that the First Amendment was meant to protect." 8 In the marketplace, however, celebrity image has a
different meaning, one often not infused with political commentary, and one where the pursuit of ideas has given way
purely to the pursuit of profit. It is telling that the settlement
did not enjoin the complete use of the Schwarzenegger image.
Instead, ODM could continue to sell the bobblehead, but
without the assault rifle. Additionally, it must donate a portion of the profits to a charity designated by Schwarzenegger."' Consequently, the governor has been able to control
how the company can depict his image and how it can spend
the profits from the sale of the doll.
A potential difficulty raised by the bobblehead case regarding the absolutist proposal is Governor Schwarzenegger's
dual status as celebrity and public official. The dual status
does not so much challenge as exemplify the proposal because
it acknowledges the multiple fora wherein publicity exists.
The argument rests upon accepting the multiple public arenas against which the right of publicity must be understood
and, moreover, specifically recognizing the distinctions between the political sphere and the marketplace. In an analysis of the bobblehead case, since Schwarzenegger became a
public official, his right of publicity should be terminated.
Consistent with the absolutist position for the First Amendment and the purposes of the right of publicity, the governor
should lose the right to challenge uses of his public image
through a right of publicity claim. Prior to stepping into the

128. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 97, at 97-98 (arguing that the principle of
freedom of speech protects the right to dissent against the government).
129. Introduction andStatement ofFacts,supra note 112, at 555.

644

SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW

Vol: 45

governor's mansion, he clearly had the right, under the right
of publicity, to sue ODM. Furthermore, the right will return
once he is no longer governor. His current status as a public
official, and not solely as a celebrity, has altered his public
persona.

B. Stalking Princess Caroline
During the 1990s, Princess Caroline of Monaco was the
subject of unwanted publicity in three German newspapers:

Freizeit Revue,'30 Bunte,13' and Neue Poste.3 ' The newspapers published over fifty photographs of her in public and
semi-public places, capturing her dining with a friend, 133 relaxing with her children,13 and spending time with a paramour on a beach.3 5 The pictures had various captions, ranging in taste from the innocuous ("Pure Happiness" captioning
a photograph of the princess with her children)' 36 to the tawdrily suggestive ("Prince Ernst August played fisticuffs and
Princess Caroline fell flat on her face" in an article which included a photograph of the wet, swimsuit3 clad princess tripping and falling on a Monte Carlo beach). 1
138
In 1999, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany
upheld the grant of an injunction against the photographs of
the princess with her children by the lower courts, but did not
uphold the grant of an injunction against the other photographs because the princess was a "public figure" and the
news stories were of legitimate public interest. 39 The princess challenged the German ruling in the European Court of
Human Rights. 40 In its ruling against Germany, the European Court found that the German court had not balanced
the interests of freedom of press and privacy adequately, thus
T

130. See Case of Von Hannover v. Germany, 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 10 (June
24, 2004).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. 11.
134. Id. T 13.
135. Case of Von Hannover,40 Eur. Ct. H.R. T 17.
136. Id. %13.
17.
137. Id
18-24.
138. Id.
24-38.
139. See id.
140. See id. % 1-7. The European Court of Human Rights hears claims of
violations of the European Court of Human Rights based on final acts by states
in the European Union.
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contravening Article 8 of the European Convention of Human
Rights,' which guaranteed to citizens a right of privacy.'
The photographs had violated the princess' legitimate expectations of privacy and did not disseminate ideas, but, instead,
"images containing very personal or even intimate 'informaTherefore, the European Court
tion' about an individual."'
concluded that enjoining the photographs would not violate
any legitimate freedom of expression interests.'
The Princess Caroline decision is a difficult one for the
absolutist position. Two possible factual elements may reconcile the result with this proposal. First, the interests of Princess Caroline's children and friends, who are not public officials, were implicated by the photographs, and, therefore, it is
their publicity interests that were vindicated. While this reasoning may explain the German court's ruling, the European
Court was clearly vindicating the princess' privacy and publicity rights. The second possibility hinges upon the distinction between public officials in Justice Black's conception of
the First Amendment' and those members of a monarchy.
In Europe, the members of the royal family are celebrities,
much like actors. They are far removed from the public officials whose political decisions affect the lives of the private
citizen, and, therefore, should be subject to close scrutiny. If
the world of public officials and actors are two different public
realms, then perhaps the world of the royal family is yet a
third realm, more closely aligned with the world of actors
than that of elected officials. In short, the absolutist position
is not challenged because Princess Caroline is not a public of-

141. Article 8 reads as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a
public authority with the exercise of this right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of
the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.
EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS art. 8 (Nov. 4, 1950), available at
http://www.hrcr.org/docs/EurConvention/euroconv3.html (last visited Apr. 9,
2005).
142. See Case of Von Hannover,40 Eur. Ct. H.R. 43.
143. Id. 59.
58-60.
144. Id. %%
145. See discussion supra Part I.
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ficial.
Because the United States has forsaken the public realm
of the monarchy, the second resolution is satisfactory. If the
Princess Caroline decision can be understood purely as applying to how the rights of the monarchy must be respected, then
the implications regarding the right of publicity and freedom
of expression in the United States are minimal. It may be difficult, however, to limit the persuasiveness of the decision
solely to those persons of royal blood. Neither the language of
the European Convention nor the decision of the European
Court limits the right of publicity to the monarchy. Thus, it
would not be a reach to apply its reasoning to a case involving
photographs of prominent U.S. political figures, such as the
Bush family. The problem is that the argument for the absolutist position rests on two prongs: the right to criticize public
officials as stated broadly by Justice Black and the different
realms of the public against which the right of publicity
should be understood. Missing from the analysis is a full consideration of the private lives of public officials, and whether
such privacy should be relinquished under the right of publicity.
Part of the problem with the absolutist position stems
from the dual goals of the right of publicity to protect both
personal and economic rights. The problem for the absolutist
position that was created by the Princess Caroline decision
reflects the difficulty of reconciling personal and economic interests within the right of publicity jurisprudence, specifically, and within jurisprudence more broadly. Another dimension of the problem is the extent to which all information
about a public official is of legitimate public interest. The
European Court ruled that the press had crossed the line between public and prurient interest in its reporting on Princess Caroline. However, it is not clear from the decision how
the line is to be drawn. After all, why should not every dimension of the life of a public official, from how he treats his
children to how he conducts his sexual life, have some legitimate public interest? If the information may affect some citizen's voting decision, why should the citizen be denied the
relevant information?
What this argument implies is that the absolutist position will have to be limited when the private lives of public officials have been violated. Perhaps these limitations can be
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handled through judicious use of other tort claims, such as intrusion or false light. Alternatively, they can be handled as
limits within the First Amendment itself. For example, in
order to use the First Amendment shield, the First Amendment claimant must establish legitimate public interest in
use of the public official's image. Using other tort causes of
action as a limit is the stronger of the two approaches. Many
of Princess Caroline's claims seem to be stronger false light,
defamation, or intrusion claims than right of publicity claims.
The danger to be avoided is turning the right of publicity into
a property right in one's name or likeness that permits a public official to stifle all uses of that name or likeness. The absolutist position will prevent this danger, and more careful consideration of how to protect the private lives of public officials
through non-publicity tort claims will serve to reconcile the
absolutist position with the problems illustrated by the European Court's decision in the Princess Caroline case.
C. A Chink in the Absolutist Armor?
Intrusion into the private lives of public officials, the privacy component of the right of publicity, poses some challenges for the absolutist position. The challenges may demonstrate a limitation of the absolutist proposal and lead the
analysis back to the balancing approach, which is contrary to
the position in the right of publicity context. However, the
absolutist position is still worth considering as a way to bring
some order to the tensions between the First Amendment and
the right of publicity.
The absolutist First Amendment position is narrow in its
application because private citizens and public figures do not
fall within its domain. Though narrowly drawn, the absolutist position is crucial in application because it will limit the
rights of public officials to stifle critical commentary without
requiring courts to scrutinize the commentary under a vague
transformativeness test. Therefore, the absolutist position is
a step in the right direction under both First Amendment and
right of publicity law. The absolutist position eliminates the
need for balancing tests. The trouble with balancing tests is
not uncertainty or relativism, both of which, counterintuitively, are the boons of balancing. Rather, the problem is that
not enough consideration is paid to what and why the judge is
required to balance.
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Examination of the absolutist position is desirable not
because it marks the end of the balancing test, but because it
forces us to reconsider what it is we are balancing when enforcing the right of publicity. The proposition is not to expand
the absolutist position to all applications of right of publicity,
but to identify and eliminate one area, the right of publicity of
public officials, where balancing is unnecessary and inconsistent with First Amendment and right of publicity values. By
identifying one area of absolutism, the goal is to enlighten
discussion in other areas where such an absolutist position
may be less tenable, such as violations of the right of publicity
of private citizens.
The Princess Caroline case does not so much put a chink
in the absolutist armor that I would like to place around the
First Amendment as it causes us to rethink what we mean by
privacy and to what extent privacy rights should extend to
public officials. Although it is difficult to conclude that the
freedom of expression should completely block the claims of
Princess Caroline, it is easy to place her claims outside the
realm of the right of publicity. What makes the bobblehead
case easy to resolve is that Schwarzenegger should not be allowed to profit from his celebrity image while in public office.
While the Princess Caroline case is difficult for an absolutist
vision of the First Amendment, it is relatively clear that her
claims are not about property or economic interests in her
likeness at all. All she sought was the type of isolation and
anonymity that her celebrity belies and that the privacy
prong of the right of publicity originally sought to protect.
The difficult question is how to reconcile personal and economic interests, especially when they become conflated in the
right of publicity.
V.

CONCLUSION

This article presented a simple point: the right of publicity of public officials, as famously articulated by Justice
Black, should be limited in order to be consistent with First
Amendment values and the purposes of the right of publicity.
Justice Black's normative vision of the First Amendment
makes the bobblehead case an easy one to resolve. However,
the vision becomes more complicated when the private lives of
public officials are taken into consideration, as the Princess
Caroline decision demonstrates. The absolutist proposal re-
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quires close scrutiny of the appropriate boundaries between
privacy and publicity for the purposes of the First Amendment and the right of publicity.
The simple point, espoused above, exposes a deeper one.
The right of publicity has been conceptualized as purely a
question of celebrity. What have been ignored are the multiple public fora in which publicity arises. The simple point requires us to rethink how publicity in the political sphere differs from that in the marketplace. Regardless of how we view
these multiple public spheres, the First Amendment requires
special scrutiny of the right of publicity when the political
sphere is implicated. Otherwise, the right of publicity will be
used to turn all public relationships, even ones imbued with
public accountability, into commercial ones. The possibility of
such an undesirable result is at stake if we allow an army of
bobbleheads carrying assault rifles to be terminated by a public official armed with the blunt sword of the right of publicity.

